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The Simple Case of In Vitro Fertilization
and Embryo Transfer
William E. May

The alilhor . ./iJrmer hook rel'ie\\' ediror for Linacre Quarterly, is a
proj"essor oj" moral th eologr in the School oj" Religious Studies at the
Catholic Unil 'ersitr oj"America.

M any people, both Catholic and non-Catholic, can readily understand
why the Catho li c Church teaches that it is morally bad to generate human
life by inseminating a married woman with sperm provided by a man who
is not her husband or by having sperm provided by her husband
inseminate another woman, a so-ca lled "surrogate" mother, who would,
after bearing the child, turn it over to the married couple. They recognize
that choosing to generate human life in this way does violence to marriage
and to human parenthood and does an injustice to the child. Such people
can likewise understand why the Catholic Church rejects the deliberate
creat ion in the laboratory of human lives which will be discarded or frozen
or used for experiments designed only to gain knowledge which may
benefit others, but which only poses harm to the lives upon which the
experiments are performed. They recognize that such procedures do
violence to the dignity of the human lives deliberately brought into
existence in the laboratory. And suc h people also understand why the
Catholic Church opposes the monitoring of human lives in utero for the
purpose of detecting and then destroying, through abortion, those
discovered to be of poor quality. Again they recognize that choosing to act
in this way does a terrible violence and injustice to unborn human lives.
But many of these same people, Catholic as well as non-Catholic, find
the teaching of the Catholic Church (as recently expressed in the Sacred
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's "Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Human Procreation"), on
the immorality of the "simple case" of in I'itro fertilizat ion, a different
matter. I n this case, there is no use of gametic materials from third parties;
the child conceived is genetically the child of husband and wife, who are
and will remain its parents. In this case, there is no deliberate creation of
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"excess" human lives which will be discarded , frozen, or made the subjects
of medical research of no benefit to them. In this case, there need be no
intention of intrauterine monitoring with a view to abortion. Nor need
there be, in this case, the use of immoral means (masturbation) to obtain
the father's sperm, for the sperm can be retrieved in morally acceptable
ways. In this case there is, apparently, only the intent to help the couple,
unable (by reason of the wife's blocked Fallopian tubes) to have a child
with whom they ardently desire to share life and to whom they wish to give
a decent home, realize their legitimate desires. Why, many people
reasonably ask , is it morally wicked - indeed, sinful, an offense against
God - to remove an ovum from the wife's body, fertilize it outside her
body with sperm from her own husband, and then transfer the developing
human life to her womb, where it will implant, develop, be nourished, and
from which it will in due time emerge in birth? What wrong is being done?
What evil is being willed? Is not the position of the Catholic Church on this
matter too rigid? Is not the Church being insensitive to the agonizing plight
of involuntarily infertile couples who are seeking, by making good use of
modern biological technologies, to realize one of the goods of marriage?
The purpose of this paper is to examine, first, the reasons given by the
Vatican I nstruction to support this teaching of the Church and , second , to
comment on these reasons in an effort to show that they are very good
reasons, rooted in truths about human persons, which truths are of critical
importance to a proper understanding of human existence.
The Reasoning Given in the Vatican Instruction

If one examines the Vatican document, one finds two major lines of
reasoning advanced to support the conclusion that it is morally wrong for
a married couple to generate new life through in vitro fertilization and
embryo transfer, even when the ovum fertilized comes from the mother's
body and the sperm used to fertilize it are retrieved in a morally acceptable
way from her husband's body.
The first argument is based on the inseparability of the life-giving
(procreative) and love-giving (unitive) meanings of the conjugal act. The
Instruction, citing Pope Paul VI 's "Humanae Vitae", first affirms "the
'inseparable connection, willed by God and unable to be broken by man on
his own initiative, between the two meanings of the conjugal act: the
unitive meaning and the procreative meaning. Indeed, by its intimate
structure, the conjugal act, while most closely uniting husband and wife,
makes them capable of the generation of new lives, according to laws
inscribed in the very being of man and woman' "I It then applies this
teaching to the problem of "homologous artificial fertilization", or the
"simple case" with which we are concerned, by affirming, with Pope Pius,
XII, that "it is never permitted to separate these different aspects to such a
degree as positively to exclude either the procreative intention [as is done
in contraceptive intercourse] or the conjugal relation' " 2 The instruction
then draws the following conclusion:
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Thus,/ertilizalion is lid llr soughl u'hen il is Ihe resull a/a 'con;ugal aC/ lI'hich is
per se suilable/or Ihe general ion a/children 10 lI'hich marriage is ordered hr ils
nalUre and by lI'hich Ihe spouses hecom e oneflesh,' BU/ji'oll1lhe 1I10rai poil1l or
vie,,' procreOlion is deprived o/ilS proper per/'e('/ion lI'hen il is nol desired as Ihe
ji'uil o/Ihe con;ugal 0('/. Ihal is 10 .1'0.1'. o/Ihe spedfic al'l o/I he spouses' union"'
(emphasis in original),

The second argument presented in the I nstruction to support its
conclusion on the immorality of the simple cases of in vitro fertilization
and embryo transfer is based on the dignity of the child who is conceived ,
The Vatican document hold s that the child "cannot be desired or
conceived as the product of an intervention of medical or biological
techniques," Why? Because "that would be equivalent to reducing him to
an object of scientific technology, No one may subject the coming of a
child into the world to conditions of technical efficacy which are to be
evaluated according to standards of control and dominion"4 The
Instruction then concludes:
Conception in vilro is the result of the technical action which presides over
fertilization, Such/erlili::alion i,l' neil her in/al'l achie"ed nor posili"ell' lI'illed 0,1'
Ihe expression andji'uil 0/ a specific 0('/ or Ihe con;ugal union, In hOll1ologous
I VF and ET. Ihere/ore. even i/'il is considered inlhe C'Ol1IeX I o/de facto exisling
sexual relOlions. Ihe generOlion orlhe human penon is oh;eclh'eil' deprh 'ed O/il,I'
proper per/eclion. nomell'. Ihal 0/ heing Ihe resull ondji'llil 0/ a ('(}n;ugal 0('/
in which the spouses can become 'cooperators with God for giving life to a new
person'5 (emphasis in original),

This second argument can, it seems to me, be summed up as follows: to
desire or cause a child as a product of a technique is to make the child an
object. But this is incompatible with the equality in personal dignity
between the child and those who give it life.
The central claims serving as the premises of the arguments advanced by
the I nstruction to show that it is always wrong to generate human life in the
laboratory are, then, the following: I) there is an inseparable connection,
willed by God and unable to be broken by man on his own initiative,
between the life-giving and love-giving meanings of the conjugal act, and
2) to conceive or desire a child as the product of a technique and not as the
fruit of the conjugal act is to treat the child as ifit were an object. Neither of
these propositions is self-evidently true. This does not, of course, mean
that they are false . Still, their truth needs to be shown, for it is upon their
truth that the conclusion, namely, that it is morally wicked to generate
human life in the laboratory, is grounded. My intention now is to offer
some reasons to support the truth of these propositions.
Marital Rights and Capabilities, the Marital Act, and the
Generation of Human Life

believe that the truth of the claim concerning the inseparable
connection between the life-giving and love-giving meanings of the
conjugal act can be established by rights and capabilities of married
persons and their relationship to the conjugal or marital act.
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By getting married, husbands and wives have not only acquired rights
that non married men and women do not have, but they have also given to
themselves capacities that non married men and women do not have.
Nonmarried men and women have the natural capacity, by virtue of
their sexual natures and their endowment with sexual organs , to engage in
genital sex. They similarly have the capacity to generate human life
through their genital acts. Yet they do not have the right to intimate genital
acts, nor do they have the right to generate human life. This is not the place
to develop fully the reasons why nonmarried men and women do not have
the right to engage in intimate genital acts. " Put briefly, the reason is
simply that they have not , by their own free choice, capacitated themselves
to respect each other as irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable persons in their
freely chosen genital acts. Such acts between nonmarried males and
females do not unite two irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable persons, but
rather join two individuals who are, in principle, replaceable,
substitutable, disposable. But human persons ought not to be treated in
this way. Similarly, nonmarried men and women do not have a right to
generate human life, precisely because they have not capacitated
themselves to receive such life lovingly , nourish it humanely, and educate it
in the love and service of God. 7 Practically all societies, it should be noted ,
rightly regard as irresponsible the generation of children through the
random copulation of unattached males and females.
Husbands and wives, on the contrary, have the right to an intimate
sharing of life and love and to the marital act (whose nature will be more
fully described later). They have this right precisely because they have
capacitated themselves, through their irrevocable gift of themselves to one
another in marriage, 8 to respect one another as irreplaceable and
nonsubstitutable spouses. They have similarly capacitated themselves to
receive human life lovingly , nourish it humanely, and educate it in the love
and service of God , for by marrying they have made themselves capable of
accepting any human life that should be given to them and of giving it the
home to which it has a right and in which it can take root and grow. They
have, in short, capacitated themselves to give to one another a unique and
singular kind of human love, marital love, a love that is fully human, total ,
faithful and exclusive until death, and fruitful.9 By so capacitating
themselves by their free choice to marry, they have acquired the right to
live as husband and wife , to share their lives fully, and to receive human life
in a manner corresponding to its dignity.
Perhaps an analogy may be helpful here. I do not have the right to
diagnose sick people and prescribe medicines for them, for I have not
chosen to study medicine and acquire the knowledge and skills needed to
do these tasks. But doctors, who have freely chosen to submit themselves
to the discipline of studying medicine and acquiring medical skills, do have
this right. Similarly, unmarried males and females do not have the right to
engage in intimate genital union and to receive human life because they
have failed to make the choices necessary to enable them to engage in these
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activities . But husbands and wives have, by their own free and responsible
choice, capacitated themselves to do so. Their right to engage in the
marital act splendidly illumines this truth. To show why, I shall now make
some observations about the marital act.
Clarification of Marital Act

The marital or conjugal act is not simply a genital act between a man and
a woman who happen to be married. Husbands and wives have the
capacity to engage in genital acts, as do nonmarried males and females,
because of their sexual nature and their endowment with genitalia. But
they have the capacity (and the right) to engage in the marital act because
they are spouses, i.e., husbands and wives . The marital act, therefore, is
more than a simple genital act between a man and a woman who happen to
be married . It is an act which participates inwardly in their marital union
and which respects the "goods" of marriage, i.e., the good of faithful and
exclusive spousal love and the good of children. Thus the marital act is one
which is 1) open to the communication of spousal love and 2) open to the
reception of human life. Thus, a genital act forced upon a wife by a
drunken husband, seeking only to gratify his sexual desires and
unconcerned with the legitimate desires of his wife, is a genital act, but is
hardly to be counted as a marital act. 10 Similarly, a genital act between
husbands and wives which is deliberately made inimical to the reception of
human life - that is, an act of contraceptive intercourse - is also one that
violates the meaning of the marital act, precisely because it dishonors one
of the goods of marriage. I I
The marital act, in other words, is by its own inner structure one which is
love-giving or open to the communication of spousal love, and life-giving
or open to the reception of human life, of a new human person. And these
two meanings or aspects of the marital act are inherently interrelated,
connected. While it is not good for human life to be generated in the
random copulation of unmarried men and women, it is good , and indeed
beautiful, that human life can be given in the "one-flesh" marital union of
husbands and wives . The bond uniting these two meanings of the marital
act shows that the love husbands and wives have for one another, while
exclusive in that they have unreservedly and completely given themselves
exclusively to one another, "foreswearing all others," is not an egoisme d
deux, a narcissistic and selfish love. It shows that their love for one another
is actually what capacitates them to welcome new human life and give it
the home to which it has the right. The bond uniting these two meanings of
the marital act shows that the marital union is one which is love-giving and
life-giving, a beautiful human reality fitting to be a "sacrament" of the
love-giving and life-giving union between Christ and His bride, the
Church. The bond uniting these two aspects of the marital act actualizes
the rights and capabilities which husbands and wives have acquired by
virtue of their choice to marry, to be "one flesh". The "connection"
between these two meanings of the marital act is inseparable insofar as this
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act is one that inwardly perfects and expresses their one-flesh marital
union, the union which capacitates them to give to each other the unique
and exclusive love rightly called " marital" love and to receive human life
lovingly, as a gift from the One Who is the source of life, and as a gift to be
welcomed as a person equal in dignity to themselves.
While husbands and wives have the right to engage in the marital act
and, through it, to receive the gift of life, they do not have the right to a
child. They do not have this right because a child is, like them, a person, a
being that is sui iuris. A child is not a thing which others can possess or
own, nor is it an act to which persons can have rights.
It is for these reasons that the proposition affirming an inseparable
connection, willed by God and unable to be broken by man on his own
initiative, between the love-giving and life-giving meanings of the marital
act is true. Human life is a gift from God which is to be received by those
who have made themselves capable of receiving it in the act which is proper
and specific to them.
'Procreating' Human Life vs. 'Reproducing' Human Life
As we have just seen, when human life is given through the act of marital
union, it comes, even when ardently desired , as a "gift" crowning the act
itself. The marital act is not an act of "making" either babies or love. Love
is not a prod uct that one makes; it is a gift that one gives - the gift of self.
Similarly, a baby is not a product inferior to its producers; rather, it is a
being equal in personal dignity to its parents. The marital act is something
which husbands and wives "do"; it is not something that they "make."
What is the difference between "making" and "doing," and what is the
human significance of this difference?
In "making", the action proceeds from an agent or agents to something
produced in the external world. Autoworkers , for instance, produce cars;
cooks produce meals; bakers produce cakes, etc. Such action is transitive
insofar as it passes from the acting subject(s) to an object fashioned by him
or her (them). In this kind of human activity, governed by the rules of art,
interest centers on the item made (and usually those which do not measure
up to standard are discarded - or at any rate, they are little appreciated).
Those who produce the products made may be morally goodautoworkers
or cooks or bakers or they may be morally bad, but our interest in
"making" is in the product, not the producers, and we would prefer to have
good cars from morally wicked autoworkers than "lemons" from morally
good ones.
In another mode of human activity - "doing" - the action abides in the
acting subject(s). The action is immanent and is governed by the
requirements of prudence, not by the rules of art. If the action is good, it
perfects the agent(s); if bad, it degrades and dehumanizes them.12 I should
note here that every act of "making" is also an act of "doing" insofar as it is
freely chosen, for the choice to make something is something that we "do,"
and the choice, as self-determining, abides in us . Thus, in choosing to make
34

Linacre Quarterly

a good cake for someone's birthday, one is choosing to respect the good of
friendship and is "doing" something good and making oneself to be, in this
respect, a good person . Likewise, in choosing to write pornography, one is
choosing to do something that is evil because it dishonors the dignity of
human persons. But the main point I wish to make here is the difference
between "making" and "doing." Making is a transitive action proceeding
from an agent to some product in the external world . Doing is an
immanent action which abides in the agent.
When human life is given through the marital act , it comes, as we have
seen, as a "gift" crowning the act itself. The marital act is not an act of
making. It is not a transitive act issuing from the spouses and terminating
in some object distinct from them. Rather, it is an act freely chosen by them
to express their marital union, one open to the gift of life. As such, it is
inwardly perfective of them as spo uses, ennobling and enriching their
marital life, the life of which they are co-subjects, such as they are cosubjects of the marital act itself. Even when they choose this act with the
ardent hope that, through it, new human life will come to be, the life
begotten is not the product of their art but is a "gift supervening on and
giving permanent embodiment to" the marital act itself. 13 Thus, when
human life comes to be through the marital act, we can rightly say that the
spouses are " procreating" or "begetting". Moreover, the act they choose is
and remains an immanent act, not a transitive one; it is an act abiding in
them and inwardly participating in their marital union.
But when human life comes to be as a result of in vitro fertilization , it is
the end product of a series of actions. transitive in nature, undertaken by
different persons. The spouses "produce" the gametic materials which
others th en manipulate in order to produce the end product - the child.
As the authors ofa report commissioned by the Catholic bishops of Great
Britain correctly noted, as a result of the process the "child comes into
existence, not as a gift supervening on an act expressive of the marital
union . .. but rather in the manner of a product of a making (and, typically,
as the end product of a process managed and carried out by persons other
than his parents)".1 4
But a child is not a product inferior to its producers and subject to
quality controls; rather, as I noted already, it is a person equal in dignity to
its parents. Thus a child ought not be treated as a product. But a child is so
treated when it is "made" in the laboratory, and this is precisely what is
done when the child comes to be as a result of in vitro fertilization. The
husband and wife are not capable of participating in this procedure
because they are husband and wife. Rather. they are capable of
participating in this process of making because they are the producers of
materials which others use in order to produce the product desired .
"Making" babies in the laboratory changes the generation of human life
from being an act of procreative love to being a transitive act of
"reproduction". But human beings who are, as it were, the created words
of God, the created words that His uncreated Word made His brothers
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and sisters when He became incarnate, ought, like the uncreated Word of
God, to be "begotten, not made."
I believe that these words - "begotten, not made" - taken from the
Nicene Creed, give us the ultimate reason why it is wrong, morally wicked ,
a sinful offense against God, to "make" babies in the laboratory. For
human babies are not things or products which others are to make. Rather,
they are beings created in the image and likeness of the all-holy God. Like
His eternally begotten Word Who is one in being with Him, they too ought
to be begotten, not made, and they ought to be begotten in the one-flesh
union of men and women who have made themselves, by getting married,
capable of receiving the gift of human life.
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